In their survey of the literature on ethnic fractionalization and economic performance, Alesina and La Ferrara (JEL 2005) identify two main directions for future research. One is to improve the measurement of diversity and the other to treat diversity as an endogenous variable. This paper tries to address these two issues. We study the effects of ethnic fractionalization on economic growth using unique time-varying measures across countries, for 26 transition economies from 1989 to 2007. Our main conclusion is that we can replicate the most recent results from the literature and show that static (exogenous) diversity is not robustly related to growth. However, when we account empirically for how ethnic diversity changes over time and treat it as an endogenous variable, our estimates show that it is negatively related to growth an effect which is robust to different estimators, specifications, and fractionalization measures.
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Introduction
There are three fundamental dimensions to any process of change. One is timing. When change starts and when it ends matters. Detecting the first signs that the status quo is sliding away is as difficult as identifying the moment when the previous status quo ceased to exist and the new one has fully established itself. The second fundamental dimension is extent. It refers to how much change was actually accomplished, whether the change itself was deliberate or unintended. The ratio between these first two dimensions is the speed of change. The third fundamental dimension is depth. This refers to how deep the effects of change turn out to be, whether or not the original change itself was intentional. There is no reason to think of these three dimensions as independent from each other. A case in point is that deep causes of change are often the most difficult ones to time, measure and attribute. Of course, this does not make them less important (the opposite is true, if anything). Institutions are a good example. They change slowly, over long periods of time, but their effects are widespread, long-lasting, and deep. We argue that the degree of fractionalization of a society along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines is in the same category. Fractionalization changes very slowly but this does not mean it does not change. It is also very difficult to measure but this does not mean they are short-lived. And diversity is often an extraordinarily deep phenomenon, but this does not mean we can afford to ignore it.
It was only in the last decade or so that ethnic fractionalization entered mainstream economics. There is now a burgeoning theoretical literature (see, e.g., Esteban and Ray, 1994 , 1999 , and Nehring and Puppe, 2002 and an active empirical agenda (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) . This body of econometric evidence has two main features in common: secondary data is often used to measure diversity and the common treatment of diversity as a non-time varying, exogenous variable.
1 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provide a thorough review of this 1 These two features are related as the secondary data used to measure diversity refers to the early 1960s. The huge popularity of the index constructed by Soviet researchers and published 2 empirical evidence and identify two main directions for future research: one is to improve the measurement of diversity and the other is to treat diversity as an endogenous variable. The objective of this paper is to try to address these two issues. In this paper, we put together a data set that contains mostly primary, census-based, data. In terms of treating diversity as an endogenous variable, we do not only exploit the time variation shown by these indexes that, to the best of our knowledge, is unique to our data set, but also subject them to a comprehensive series of diagnostics tests covering the various (often related) aspects of the endogeneity matter.
Although the seminal papers of Mauro (1995) and Easterly and Levine (1997) offer econometric evidence showing that greater levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization hinder economic performance, there has been less success in sustaining the evidence for such negative, direct effect. Easterly (2001) argues that the effect of ethnic fractionalization is conditional: it slows down economic activity only in countries with "sufficiently bad" institutions. Bluedorn (2001) and Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) show that the negative impact of diversity on growth is particularly strong in less democratic countries. Posner (2004) argues that the negative effect is supported only by a restricted polarization index:
restricted in that it includes only "politically relevant" ethnic groups. Montalvo and ReynalQuerol (2005a) argue that the direct effect of fractionalization on economic performance is weak and suggest focusing on polarization instead. In short, the original negative first-order effect of ethnic diversity on economic growth has been challenged and, accordingly, the literature seems to have turned to identifying the main channels through which diversity may affect the economy (i.e., indirect effects). Collecting primary data over various periods of time for a relatively in the Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk and Apenchenko, 1964 ) is due in large part to its inclusion in Taylor and Hudson's World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (1972) . For studies that use this index, see Mauro (1995) , Easterly and Levine (1997) , Collier (2001) , La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and Woo (2003a Woo ( , 2003b .
3 homogenous set of countries gives us the chance to revisit the original research question.
In what follows we report on the construction of a unique data set based mostly on primary data (national censuses) to measure ethnic diversity over time for a sample of countries that closely resemble a "natural experiment" (the 26 former centrally-planned economies, from 1989 to 2007). These are said to resemble a "natural experiment" because until 1989 they shared a very similar set of economic and political institutions (central planning under socialism), but have since followed radically different economic and political trajectories. Using these data, we are able to replicate the most recent results from the literature and show that static (exogenous) diversity is indeed not robustly correlated with economic growth. However, when we capture empirically how ethnic diversity changes over time and treat it as an endogenous variable, our estimates show that ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to growth and this finding is robust to the use of different econometric estimators, specifications, polarization measures as well as to an index of ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data collection effort and the measurement methods used. Section 3 discusses the econometric methodology, presents the main results and subjects them to various robustness tests. Section 4 concludes with some brief suggestions for future research.
Measurement
In this paper, we collect primary data (census-based) to measure ethnic diversity (fractionalization and polarization) over time (from 1989 to 2007) for a sample of 26 former centrally-planned economies. 2 National censuses are the preferred and most reliable source of 2 We divided the sample in five groups for exposition purposes (Figure 1 ). The transition countries in ASIA are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The BALKAN countries are Albania, Bulgaria, ethnic diversity data. Unfortunately they are only conducted once a decade, at best. Microcensuses and demographic surveys, which are arguably the second best sources of primary diversity data, tend to be conducted at five-year intervals. With this in mind, we assess what would be the maximum number of time periods for which we could obtain a balanced panel data set on the demographic (ethnic) composition of these 26 transition countries. We identify four time periods: 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2007 . This means we use primary data from national censuses for the first and third period and data from micro-censuses and demographic surveys for the second and fourth period. 3 Although it is difficult to objectively judge the quality of these different sources of data, note that in each country collection of these data was done by the same agency, with the methodologies. They differ in that censuses cover the entire population and micro-censuses cover a representative sample. These figures were checked against various additional sources, including Rosenko (1999) For the computation of the fractionalization indices, we apply the commonly used formula capturing the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnic groups (e.g., Alesina et al. 2003 ):
where s i is the share of total population belonging to ethnic group i. The index takes values between zero (for a perfectly ethnically homogeneous country) and one (highly heterogeneous country).
One shortcoming of this measure is that the same value of the index can correspond to different distributions (Fearon, 2003) . This sensitivity of the index to the total number of underlying groups calls for care. We compare two approaches. First, we use an unrestricted set with all disaggregated data allowing the number of ethnic groups for each country to vary over time. In the second approach, we restrict the number of groups for each country to be the same over time. 5 We find the differences are small. shows that these countries end up much more ethnically homogenous than they started with over a short period of time. This suggests that there may be value in re-thinking the assumption of exogeneity. Why does diversity change over time? One general cause is, of course, migration flows. These may be driven by better economic performance and opportunities in the destination country as well as by inferior economic performance and/or civil war and ethnic cleansing in the origin country. In developing countries, such a process should surely take decades to unfold. However, there are special circumstances in our sample of transition countries which allow for this process to take place in a much shorter period of time.
Firstly, with the collapse of communism, workers become free to move to other countries (while under communism mobility restrictions often referred to the city, let alone country) in search of better economic opportunities (Campos and Coricelli, 2002) . Secondly, the ubiquitous Russian Another concern about the existing ethnic fractionalization indices is that the definition of ethnic groups may change for political reasons. Alesina et al. (2003) remark that Somalia was counted as a homogeneous country prior to the civil war in 1991 with the notion of linking clans to ethnic groups coming into being only after that. Note that there are no disputes about group definitions in our data. Census questionnaires enumerate a fixed number of ethnic groups and let the respondent indicate to which she belongs. The residual option of "others" or "none of the above" is provided and taken into account (as one single group) when computing our diversity measures.
The emerging consensus is that polarization is the theoretically appropriate concept for measuring diversity. 7 The family of polarization measures developed by Ray (1994, 1999) has been implemented in various ways. The one proposed by Alesina et al. (2003) is as follows:
where K is a scaling factor and α is a constant between 0 and 1.6. Note that this formulation requires a measure of distance between groups (the last term in the right-hand side).
Conceptually, distance can be thought of, for instance, as differences in median incomes.
Because of data constraints, distance is often assumed to be constant. 8 An alternative implementation proposed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) is:
7 Fractionalization measures increase in the number of groups, while polarization maximum is reached with two groups of equal size. 8 To be more precise, the ADEKW index of polarization is the original index of polarization of Esteban and Ray (1994) . The Alesina et al. (2003) index are obtained using different values of α and under the assumption that distance is constant and equal to 1.
Notice that although Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) may look similar they are rather different. Esteban and Ray deal with the calculation of polarization when distances are continuous while Montalvo and Reynal-Querol provide an index to calculate polarization when distances are discrete.
We use equations (1), (2), and (3) to calculate various measures of fractionalization and polarization. Appendix 1 shows that the pair-wise correlations between our measures, on the one hand, and investment, human capital and labor growth rates, on the other, is small (the largest is .11). Notice that the simple correlation among our measures of fractionalization and polarization is high (the smallest is .83). It is also worth noting that while the correlation coefficients between our diversity measures and human capital tend to be positive, the same with respect to investment and population growth tend to be negative (although in both cases they are not statistically significant). In between these extremes, the negative correlation between growth and all our measures of fractionalization and polarization is milder, ranging from -.24 to -.37.
Results
The objective of this section is to revisit the effect of ethnic diversity on economic growth. To do so, we estimate the standard augmented Solow model proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) . 9 MRW's econometric specification is as follows:
where Y/L is output per capita, s k is the rate of investment in physical capital, s h is the rate of investment in human capital, n is the population growth rate, g is the rate of technological 9 In the fractionalization and growth literature, this approach is used by, for instance, Montalvo and Reynal-Queyrol (2003) . 9 change and δ is the depreciation rate.
10 Subscripts for countries and (the four) time periods are omitted. Notice that although the estimation in the original MRW paper was done by OLS, we here follow the more recent literature (e.g., McCleary and Barro, 2006) and first estimate (4) using SUR. Table 1 has our results treating polarization and fractionalization in a manner similar to that of the literature, that is, as exogenous variables. The specifications in Table 1 all include initial income while all of those in Table 2 exclude it. Column 1 in Table 1 shows that the coefficients on investment, human capital, and population carry their expected signs (positive, positive and negative, respectively). Initial income is negative, but insignificant. Exogenous ethnic fractionalization, however, has almost negligible on growth.
11 Column 2 shows that the ethnic fractionalization index has no effect on growth, while columns 3 and 4 show that diversity is also not significant when proxied by any of the two versions of the Alesina et al.'s polarization measure. The same conclusion holds for the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol measure (column 5). These results may well be driven, for example, by ethnic not being the appropriate dimension for conflict in these countries. In order to address this possibility, we computed two additional indexes. First, a principal components index of ethnic, linguistic and religious 10 We follow MRW in assuming that the sum of g and δ is constant. Although they assume it is constant at 5%, here we report results assuming that the sum of rates is 7.5% so as to reflect the larger depreciation observed in the capital stocks inherited from the socialist period.
11 The results from a standard Granger-causality test show that there is no evidence supporting the notion that growth (Granger-) causes diversity. These are available from the authors upon request. In previous versions of this paper we also reported specifications for the level of per capita GDP in the left-had side, instead of the growth rate. Our main results are unaffected by this change (in other words, we still find that fractionalization is important vis-à-vis growth only when its dynamics is fully taken into account.) 10 fractionalization dimensions was constructed. Column 6 reports these results and shows that this broader index is also not statistically significant. Second, we construct an average index of these three fractionalization dimensions. Column 7 confirms that diversity is still statistically insignificant. Table 2 repeats the estimations of Table 1 but excluding initial income. Column 1 shows that the coefficients on investment, human capital, and population are now all significant and carry their expected signs (positive, positive, and negative, respectively). However, the coefficients of all diversity indexes are still not significant, except column 4 which shows that the ethnic polarization index with α=1.6 is negative and statistically significant.
In sum, these findings on fractionalization are in line with most of the recent literature in that these estimates show that its direct effect on economic performance is weak. One possibility that the literature has not yet explored is that diversity changes overt time and may also be endogenous (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) . Fast growing economies will attract migrants, while newly independent states may try to expel formerly dominant ethnic minorities (say, Russians). We now turn to our set of econometric results that try to take these possibilities into account.
In Table 3 , we report our estimates of the augmented Solow model using instrumental variables techniques. These allow us to treat ethnic diversity as an endogenous variable. With initial income in the specification, we find that the coefficients on investment, population, and initial income are not significant, although the one for human capital is positive and statistically significant. Column 1 shows our results using dynamic (endogenous) diversity: the coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is now negative and significant. Columns 2 and 3 show that for the two versions of the Alesina et al.'s polarization measure and for the Montalvo and ReynalQuerol's index (column 4), the coefficients on ethnic fractionalization are also negative and now statistically significant. Column 5 shows that our principal components' ethnic-linguisticreligious fractionalization index generates similar conclusions, namely that dynamic and endogenous fractionalization seem to have a negative and robust first-order effect on economic growth. Column 6 presents similar results for the average of the three diversity dimensions (ethnic, religion and linguistic). Table 4 presents similar results but excluding initial income from all specifications. As it can be seen, the only standard explanatory variable that remains significant is human capital.
For the set of fractionalization indexes, we can see that all of the relevant coefficients are still negative and all except one (out of six) are statistically significant.
Instrument selection is always a difficult matter. It is made more severe in this case by the fact that there has been little effort to explain theoretically or empirically the evolution of ethnic diversity over time. In this light, the strategy we follow is to identify a set of instruments which are capable of convincingly pass as a wide range of tests as possible. We tried a number of variables and combinations of variables and settled on the lagged diversity index and latitude (the absolute value of distance from the equator).
We started by examining the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, which assesses the severity of endogeneity in a regression estimated by instrumental variables. The null hypothesis is that endogeneity among regressors would not yield consistent OLS estimates and thus the rejection of the null would suggest that IV techniques are more appropriate. As it can be seen in the bottom-panels of Tables 3 and 4 (heading "diagnostics"), the null is not rejected in all cases at conventional (95%) confidence levels.
We next report the results from the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.
The objective in this case is to help establish the validity of the instruments we use, that is, that our instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals and that their inclusion is justified. A rejection of the null hypothesis would suggest that the instruments are not valid. As it can be seen in the "diagnostics" panels of Tables 3 and 4 , the null is rejected in all cases at conventional (95%) confidence levels suggesting that the instruments we use are valid.
In terms of identification, next we report on tests for the relevance of the instrument set, that is, whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. We report the Shea Partial R-squared (with only one endogenous regressor, this statistic is equivalent to the more common partial R-square) and the F-test of the excluded instruments in the corresponding first-stage regression. The results from these two tests support the validity of our set of instruments. The R-square figures are very high and the value of the F-statistic is above 10 in all specifications of tables 3 and 4. The Anderson canonical correlation likelihoodratio test (CCLR) corroborates these conclusions. Its null hypothesis is that the model is underidentified so a rejection of the null would suggest that the estimated models are identified.
As it can be seen, this turns out to be the case for all columns in Tables 3 and 4 .
Finally, we also report the Pagan-Hall and RESET tests. The Pagan-Hall tests for heteroskedasticity in the IV context. None of the results in tables 3 and 4 suggest any heteroskedasticity problems in the estimated equations' disturbance process. The RESET test we report is the Ramsey's regression error specification test as proposed by Pesaran and Taylor (1999) . It shows all models in tables 3 and 4 are correctly specified in that omitted variables bias does not seem to be severe.
For the sake of sensitivity analysis, we also apply the Blundell and Bond's (1998) System GMM estimator to our data. Table 5 presents GMM estimations for our augmented Solow model. The coefficients on investment, population, and human capital are statistically insignificant in all specifications (Table 5 ). The diversity indices are treated as exogenous and it can be seen that none of the various versions of the index is significant (the fractionalization index in Column 1, the Alesina et al. polarization index in column 2, the MRQ index in Column 3, and in columns 4 and 5, our two ethnic-linguistic-religious fractionalization indices). Notice that we were not able to generate results for the Alesina et al. 1.6 polarization index. Overall, these results in table 5 are similar to the one we discussed above in that exogenous diversity has no discernible first-order impact on economic growth. Moreover, the validity of the instruments in the system GMM results is supported by the Hansen test. Note also that we use the two-step estimation, where the standard errors are corrected for with panel specific auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity. Moreover, we also apply the Windmeijer correction (Roodman, 2006) . In our view, we prefer the results in tables 3-4 to those in Tables 5-6 (that is, we prefer the IV estimates to the System GMM ones) because our panel is very short both in terms of countries and especially in terms of time periods. Despite the potential problems with the GMM results, it is comforting to see that the main conclusions change little compared to the IV results, namely, in order to obtain a first-order negative effect of diversity on growth, it seems necessary to account for the dynamics of diversity and to treat it as an endogenous variable.
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12 As our panel covers only four periods and we use the one-period lagged diversity as an instrument, we are unable us to run the AR(2) test.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated a number of questions related to the behavior of ethnic diversity over time and across countries and its effects in terms of economic performance. We studied how much weight should be attached to the assumption that ethnic diversity does not change over time. We noted that this assumption is used widely. Paradoxically, the index of ethnic fractionalization that is commonly used in the literature was developed by researchers in countries that turn out to experience the most dramatic changes in ethnic diversity in a very short period of time. We use census or micro-census data to create such indices for four points in time for a sample of 26 transition economies. Using these measures, and in line with the recent literature, we find weak evidence of a direct effect of diversity in the standard augmented Solow growth model. On the other hand, our panel estimates show that dynamic (endogenous) ethnic fractionalization is negatively related to growth, with equally robust results obtaining for measures of ethnic polarization.
As mentioned above, there are a number of issues that make the situation of ethnic groups in the transition countries somewhat special. In our view, those reasons support the dramatic changes in the ethnic composition we observe in such a short period of time. Although we do not think it is reasonable to expect that changes of this magnitude could be observed for other groups of developing countries over ten years or so, data may be available that would allow future research to relax the assumption that since 1960, that is over the last half-century, the degree of ethnic homogeneity has not change meaningfully in poorer countries. Such test can be accomplished, for instance, using decade averages of available ethnic diversity measures. It is clear too, however, that the construction of census-based measures for larger samples of developing countries over longer periods of time will be a considerably more demanding task. Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. ;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 24;24;24;24 R-squared -3.58;0.19 0.16;0.32 -3.13;0.22 0.17;0.34 -2.98;0.23 0.17;0.34 -2.87;0.25 0.17;0.38 -2.94;0.24 0.17;0.34 -2.85;0.22 0.17;0. 33 Note: SUR estimates. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. [l(1) .] diversity, and latitude. In the top panel, standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Period dummies are always included, not reported, and are all significant at 1% in all specifications. Note: System GMM estimates for growth rate of GDP per capita, 26 transition economies between 1989 and 2007. In the level equation, the instrument used is the first difference of the lagged dependent variable. In the transformed equation, the instrument used is the second lag of the dependent variable. In the top panel, standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Period dummies are always included, not reported, and are all significant at 1% in all specifications 55 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2002 2003-2007 
